

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS / RESPONSE PLANNING IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS



Presented by

Greg Pece
Air Transport Service

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
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Overview



1. **Overview of UN Secretariat Fleet (DOS/DPO/DPPA)**
2. UN Secretariat “type challenges” (disasters / emergencies)
3. Plans / resources in terms of disaster / emergency
 - Prevention
 - Response
 - Recovery
4. Conclusion

Long Term Charters and Military Letters of Assist in 17 Missions Overseen by Air Transport Service



- ~190 Fixed and Rotary-Wing Aircraft on Commercial Contracts and Military Letters of Assist (LOA) ; 27 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

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
Disaster / Emergency for DOS

- Natural Disasters / Medical crisis / Humanitarian crisis:
 - DOS supports where and when necessary (e.g. Ebola response)
 - Typically not the primary responder / lead – left to specialized agencies / MS
 - Yet, able to set up large mechanisms of coordination – via General Assembly resolutions and SC mandates, as recommended by the Secretary-General
- Otherwise: Disasters / Emergencies involving Staff and Peacekeeping Troops
- Approx. 86,000 troops and staff in missions world-wide
- **PREVENTION / RESPONSE / RECOVERY (Plans)**
 - Real time information gathering / threat detection
 - Airborne response / defensive measures
 - Day / night troop resupply
 - CASEVAC / MEDEVAC response
 - Evacuation
- We owe it to our deployed troops, staff, and civilians we protect to be able to provide a reasonable level of emergency prevention, response and recovery.



Support to External Disasters / Challenges

- Creation of Mission
 - DOS acting as the logistics focal point of the Secretariat
 - Most direct and powerful tool of Secretary-General to implement a holistic, multi-agency response
 - e.g., UNMEER
- Provision / readiness of UN fleet to support other agencies, funds and programmes, as required.
- In the past --- did assume control over infrastructural and air traffic control elements in order to facilitate operations (e.g., UNMIK)



UN Chapter 6 / 7 “Secretariat Ops” can be, and in many cases are, vulnerable to threats, asymmetric and direct



UN Charter Chapter 7 and the Power of the Security Council

Article 39 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall recommend what action should be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, at any time, on the basis of information received, make recommendations to the parties concerned or to the States concerned, or to all States, for the carrying out of measures to comply with its provisions.

Article 41 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These measures may include complete or partial suspension of the economic relations and communications with the States concerned, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 are inadequate, it may take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security. It may authorize such action to be taken by air, sea, or land forces of its Members or by such of the air, sea, or land forces of its Members as it may call upon.



Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers:

We need to change the way we are doing business



ABSTRACT

Since 1948, more than 3,500 personnel have lost their lives serving in United Nations peace operations with 943 due to acts of violence. During the past four years (2013 – 2017) a consistent increase in peacekeeper fatalities due to violent acts resulted in 195 deaths.

This report, directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, uses internal United Nations data and reporting to analyze the causes of fatalities due to violent acts. Based upon over 160 personal interviews and the professional experience of the authors, the report provides no-nonsense, practical, short and long-term actions to reduce fatalities.


The report's focus is to change the way the United Nations does business in high-security risk peacekeeping operations.

DECEMBER 19, 2017



Prevention – Close coordination between DPPA, DOS, DSS and DPO – engagement, surveillance, warning (Information and Technology)


- Political engagement to diffuse / anticipate threats (DPPA)
- Force Protection measures (DSS / DPO) – AVSEC policy
- Infrastructure development / airfield OPS (Annex 17 // Force and DSS planning)
- Physical defenses, procedures, stand-off measures, perimeters, active engagement outside wire – (cooperation w/ stakeholders?)
- ISR –Reconnaissance and Surveillance to get the whole picture
 - Camp security
 - Convoy Escort
 - Threat detection
 - Force multiplier : Strategic planning // tactical real-time operational Situational awareness



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Example: Route Recon by UAS



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Failed prevention: Asymmetric attacks on facilities VBIED attack on Gao, Nov 2017



- Damaged UN aircraft and Air Ops facilities
- Protection of air assets requires not only reference to ICAO Annex 17, but tenets of Military Force Protection and UN Department of Safety and Security Policies
- In some cases aircraft are more at risk “on the ground”
- Attack helicopters launched / Fixed-wing commercial medevac aircraft supported



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Prevent: Evacuation Plans



- Long term Airliner Charter
- Short term Charters
- Standby contracts
- Potential support from Member States
- **Obviously no guarantee that aircraft will be able to arrive under high threat situations



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Active response to “disasters against troops / staff”



- 24 / 7 Military and commercial aircraft capability for defense, resupply, movement
- UAS and ISR for real-time Situational awareness
- EXAMPLE: Semuliki attack, DRC, DEC 2017
 - Attack on MONUSCO base on banks of Semuliki River
 - Evening attack, ADF fighters wearing FARDC uniforms
 - 15 Peacekeepers killed, 53 wounded
 - Any initial response would have needed to take place during hours of darkness
 - Helicopters did not fly until the next morning / no UAS



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Respond: Active ISR to provide situational awareness



IMAGE DETAIL: Enlargement of the scene of the incident.

IA COMMENT: Hermes was re-tasked at approximately 1300hrs to conduct overwatch of a convoy following a mine or IED strike. The convoy was traveling from Douentze to Bambara Mounde.

Hermes arrived in the area at approximately 1405hrs and commenced scanning the surrounding area for any follow up threats while the convoy waited for CASEVAC.

The force protection vehicle had driven over a mine or IED which was emplaced just at the edge of the concrete for the bridge. The remnants of a vehicle was at the side of the road, likely from a former explosion in the same place. The remainder of the convoy vehicles had parked 200m south of the bridge.

Two local vehicles were observed approaching the area but then turning round after seeing the incident.



IMAGE DETAIL: The CASEVAC helicopter departing the area.

IA COMMENT: Following successful casualty extraction the helicopter left the area at 1658hrs.

The remainder of the convoy then filtered past the bridge, driving through the shallow water, and formed up on the north side in preparation to continue the journey to Bambara Mounde.

At approximately 1730hrs the convoy was complete on the north side of the bridge and began moving again towards Bambara Mounde.

During time overhead, no suspicious activity was identified.



Respond and Recover: Infrastructure development



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
Respond / Recover: Airfield / helipad lighting (NVG compatible systems) – fuller night capability



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Respond and Recover: Approaches allowing for all weather / day night response



Timbuktu Airfield Flight Validation CL604 RWY 07 Left no offset.

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Recover: 24 / 7 day and night CASEVAC from remote operations away from facilities (i.e., ad hoc landing zones, NVG ops,) – Mil or Commercial



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Recover: Standby Contracts in support of air ambulance services



- Ex: Benghazi attack on UN vehicles (UNSMIL) - 2019
- 2 UN Staff killed, 1 seriously injured
- Required air ambulance services // fixed-wing rapid response for advanced hospital care
- Variable response (usually fast, workload permitting)



Recover: Mass Causality Evacuation Planning and coordination



A reminder of why we need air logistics...



10 days on the road (with IED threats), vs. a 40 mins flight

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Thank you!
Greg Pece
Chief, Air Transport Service, UN DOS



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